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Environmental Overreach: The EU’s Carbon
Tax on International Aviation
Surya Gablin Gunasekara*
Abstract
On November 27, 2012—without the fanfare of a Rose Garden
ceremony—President Obama signed into law a bill that forbids United
States airlines from participating in the European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”). Environmental organizations bemoaned the
President’s decision after having urged him to veto the bill. Supporters of
the law hailed the passage as a win for American sovereignty, preventing
an illegitimate and disingenuous environmental tax on U.S. carriers and
passengers. This article addresses the aviation industry’s role in global
climate change, and offers an in-depth analysis of the EU ETS and the
European Commission’s decision to include international aviation in the
ETS. It also discusses the legal implications of the EU’s Aviation Directive
and the legal challenge before the European Court of Justice. Finally, this
article discusses the aforementioned legislation and exposes the pitfalls of
the EU’s unilateral action.
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I. Introduction
[T]he EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme, when applied to
U.S. airlines, is the wrong way to achieve the right
objective. It goes against international law and
agreements, and it brings the hand of European regulators
into our own airspace. The EU’s go-it-alone approach is
not the way to find a global solution to a global problem.1
~ Congressman Nick Rahall (D-W.Va.)
Through the efficiency and reliability of global air travel, distant
nations have been brought closer together in a way that was not
contemplated even a hundred years ago. 2 A trans-Atlantic trip that once
took weeks has been reduced to mere hours. 3 As this means of
transportation evolved through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, air
travel has continued to be more accessible and affordable. 4 Every year,
1.
158 CONG. REC. H6,332 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2012) (statement of Rep. Nick Rahall).
2.
See Jad Mouawad & Christopher Drew, Airline Industry at Its Safest Since the
Dawn of the Jet Age, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013, at A1 (“[F]lying has become so reliable
that a traveler could fly every day for an average of 123,000 years before being in a fatal
crash.”); U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT 4 (2012), available at
http://airconsumer.dot.gov/reports/2012/September/2012SeptATCR.PDF (showing that
seventy-six percent of commercial airline flights arrive on time); STEVEN A. MORRISON &
CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 3 (1995) (describing the first
American commercial plane flight in 1914, which was an eighteen mile voyage); BUREAU OF
TRANSP., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., STATISTICS, FLIGHTS: ALL CARRIERS – ALL AIRPORTS
(2012), available at http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=2 (showing that
almost 1.4 million international flights took place in 2012) (on file with the WASHINGTON
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
3.
See Curtiss NC-4, SMITHSONIAN NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE MUSEUM,
http://airandspace.si.edu/collections/artifact.cfm?id=A19270032000 (last visited Sept. 7,
2013) (explaining that the first transatlantic flight, on the Curtiss NC-4, took twenty-four
days) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT);
Flights
to
New
York,
BRITISHAIRWAYS.COM,
http://www.britishairways.com/en-gb/destinations/new-york/flights-to-new-york (last visited
Sept. 7, 2013) (stating that a nonstop flight from London to New York takes seven hours
thirty minutes) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT).
4.
See GEORGE WILLIAMS, THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPACT OF
DEREGULATION 20 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the proliferation of major traffic hubs during
the last quarter of the twentieth century and the drastic increase in passenger numbers during
that time); MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 2, at 11 (showing that the average domestic
air fare per passenger mile has fallen consistently since 1970).
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about 2.2 billion passengers travel on the world’s air carriers, “with
predictions of 9 billion passengers by 2025.” 5 There is no doubt that
modern society has become dependent on aviation for day-to-day life.6
As global air transportation increases,7 concerns over the amount of
carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, ozone, and methane (collectively greenhouse
gases, or GHGs) emitted from the aviation industry also escalate.8 Like any
motor vehicle that runs on fossil fuels, aircrafts release gaseous and
particulate emissions into the atmosphere.9 Aircrafts are unique, however,
in that their emissions are injected directly into the atmosphere at high
altitudes. 10 There is scientific consensus that cumulative anthropogenic
GHG emissions are driving climate change,11 the precise effects of which
are still being debated. 12 The fact remains that international aviation
emissions represent only about two percent of total global carbon dioxide
emissions, which is a tiny fraction of the overall anthropogenic emissions.13
Over the last two decades, international bodies and national
governments have attempted to curb emissions through various command-

5.
INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, ICAO ENVTL. REPORT 116 (2010)
[hereinafter ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT].
6.
See AIR TRANSPORT ACTION GROUP, AVIATION: BENEFITS BEYOND BORDERS 2 4
(2012),
available
at
http://aviationbenefitsbeyondborders.org/sites/aviationbenefitsbeyondborders.org/files/pdfs/
ABBB_Medium%20Res.pdf (explaining that 3.5% of global GDP is supported by aviation
and that air transport carriers haul close to 35% of world trade by value).
7.
See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 19 (stating that from 1989
2009, total scheduled airline traffic grew at a yearly rate of 4.4%).
8.
See id. at 69 (discussing the concern over climate change during the past decade
and the increasing pressure on the aviation industry to reduce its impact on climate change).
9.
See id. at 38 (stating that aircraft produce emissions much like those produced
during fossil fuel combustion).
10.
See Daniel B. Reagan, Note, Putting International Aviation into the European
Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Can Europe Do It Flying Solo?, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 349, 349 (2008) (citing Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Aviation and the
Global Atmosphere: Summary for Policy Makers, at 3 (1999)) (“Aircraft release gaseous and
particulate emissions at high altitudes directly into the atmosphere.”).
11.
See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 38 (“Global climate change
is caused by the accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the lower atmosphere.”).
12.
See Janelle Veno, Comment, Flying the Unfriendly Skies: The European Union’s
New Proposal to Include Aviation in Their Emissions Trading Scheme, 72 J. AIR L. & COM.
659, 659 (2007) (stating that scientists around the world debate global warming as well as
the effect it may have on the earth).
13.
See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 38 (stating that aviation
accounts for two percent of global carbon dioxide emissions and showing that carbon
dioxide emissions from aviation make up a miniscule portion of the world’s anthropogenic
carbon dioxide emissions).
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and-control and market-based emissions schemes. 14 Perhaps the most
famous agreement dedicated to climate change and the reduction of
greenhouse gases is the Kyoto Protocol (Protocol).15 In 1997, the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Control (UNFCCC) created the
Kyoto Protocol, a treaty in which Member States agreed to the task of
reducing their carbon dioxide emissions. 16 The Protocol established an
initial five-year commitment period, from 2008 to 2012, for Member States
to achieve their reduction goals. 17 The Protocol also created mandatory
reduction targets during the commitment period that are at least five percent
below the countries’ 1990 emissions levels.18 In 2012, the Member States
agreed to extend the Kyoto Protocol for a few years and to commit to more
ambitious actions to reduce greenhouse gases.19
One of the principal means of reducing greenhouse gases suggested
by the Kyoto Protocol was an emissions trading system.20 Emissions trading
systems involve exchanging credits, which permit the holder to emit a
predetermined amount of carbon dioxide.21 Actors that emit more than their
credit limit can purchase additional credits while those who emit less than
their credit limit can sell their unused credits.22 Under this theory, actors
14.
See Reagan, supra note 10, at 350 (discussing how regulatory bodies over the past
two decades have “moved beyond command-and-control regulation” and have begun using
market-based systems like emissions trading).
15.
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nationals Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
16.
See id. at art. 2 (defining the goals of the Kyoto Protocol).
17.
See id. at art. 3, para. 1 (stating that Member States must “ensure that their
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions . . . do not exceed their
assigned amounts, . . . with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at
least 5 percent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012”). Additionally, in
2012, delegates from Kyoto Protocol Member States decided to extend the Protocol for “a
few years.” John M. Broder, Climate Talks Yield Commitment to Ambitious, but Unclear,
Actions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2012, at A13 (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
18.
See Veno, supra note 12, at 660 (discussing mandatory emission reduction targets
under the Kyoto Protocol).
19.
See Broder, supra note 17 (stating that the delegates from over 190 nations agreed
to extend the Protocol and to use more ambitious, albeit unspecified, methods to combat
emissions).
20.
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 17 (“The Parties . . . may participate in
emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3.”).
21.
See Veno, supra note 12, at 660 (explaining that an emissions trading system
issues credits to polluters, each credit allowing a set amount of emissions, and lets the
polluters buy and sell each other’s credits in order to cover their respective amounts of
pollution).
22.
See id. (noting that an emissions trading system permits low emissions-producing
entities to sell off their unused credits for profit, while high emissions-producing entities
must buy credits to account for their pollution).

ENVIRONMENTAL OVERREACH

5

that can reduce emissions at a low cost will do so, while actors that are not
financially equipped to reduce emissions will be able to purchase credits.23
Essentially, the emissions trading system is a market-based scheme
designed to reduce greenhouse gases in the most cost-effective method.24
The European Union (EU) 25 has implemented an Emissions
Trading Scheme (ETS) to meet its target Kyoto Protocol reductions, which
represents the most ambitious emissions trading plan to date.26 Phase I of
the ETS began in 2005 and only covered carbon dioxide emissions from
“energy, metal production, mineral, and paper industries in EU memberstates.”27 Phase I represents the first wave of a planned EU implementation
strategy, which will slowly tighten emissions targets and expand to include
new industries.28 Under Directive 2008/101/EC (Aviation Directive) civil
aviation was included in the EU ETS.29 The Aviation Directive extended
emissions trading to the aviation industry by covering flights within the EU
beginning in 2011 and all flights arriving and departing from the EU
beginning on January 1, 2012.30
23.
See id. (explaining that, in theory, entities that cannot cut emissions cost
effectively will buy credits from those entities that can do so cost effectively).
24.
See Why Emissions Trading is More Effective than Command and Control, INT’L
EMISSIONS
TRADING
ASS’N,
http://www.ieta.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=418:why-emissionstrading-is-more-effective-than-command-and-control&catid=54:3-minutebriefing&Itemid=135 (last visited Sept. 10, 2013) (describing emissions trading and arguing
that a cap and trade system “is the most effective way of minimizing the cost” of emissions
reduction) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
25.
The European Union is an economic and political union consisting of twentyseven Member States, which are primarily located throughout Europe. It was created to
serve as “a political and economic community with supranational and intergovernmental
features,” evidenced by the fact that Member States “delegated to the Union the exercise of
certain national competencies.” Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The Authority of the European
Union to Unilaterally Impose and Emissions Trading Scheme, 21 AIR & SPACE LAW., no. 4,
2008, at 5–6.
26.
See Reagan, supra note 10, at 350 (“The European Union (EU) has implemented
its Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)—the most ambitious CO2 emissions trading scheme to
date.”).
27.
See id. (describing phase I of the ETS, including its starting date in 2005 and the
industries that the regulation covered during that phase).
28.
See id. at 363 (describing how phase I was just the first part of the scheme, with
later phases expanding to cover more GHGs and industries while simultaneously tightening
emissions caps).
29.
See Council Directive 2008/101, 2009 O.J. (L 8) 3 (EC) [hereinafter Aviation
Directive],
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:008:0003:0021:EN:PDF (stating
that the Directive’s purpose was to include aviation in the EU’s emissions trading scheme).
30.
See id. at 17 (requiring that “[f]rom 1 January 2012 all flights which arrive at or
depart from an aerodrome situated in the territory of a Member State” shall be subject to the
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The aviation industry only produces a small portion of the total
greenhouse gases, yet that percentage could grow.31 Civil aviation, like all
transportation sectors, is working towards emissions reduction through
efficiency; however, the EU’s extension of their ETS to the international
community presents broader international legal ramifications with extrajurisdictional consequences. 32 Section I of this article will address the
aviation industry and the role that it plays in global climate change. Section
II will offer an in-depth analysis of the EU’s ETS, and the European
Commission’s (“EC”) decision to include international aviation in the ETS.
Section III discusses the legal implications of the EU’s Aviation Directive,
the legal challenge before the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), the U.S.
legislation blocking American air carriers from participating in the ETS,
and problems with emissions related taxes to aviation. Finally, this article
presents the alternative to a multilateral international aviation emissions
target allowing for civil aviation to organically reach new efficiencies and
alternatives.
II. Civil Aviation Emissions and Global Climate Change
A. Climate Change Overview
The atmosphere is a fragile shield that protects the Earth while
providing a temperature equilibrium that can sustain life. 33 Typically, as
sunlight penetrates the atmosphere, “carbon dioxide traps heat and warms
the Earth.”34 The temperature on Earth is maintained by a delicate balance
between energy input from the sun and energy lost back into space.35
Since pre-industrial times the increase in GHGs has altered the
energy balance in the climate system and is claimed to be one of the leading
EU ETS); Reagan, supra note 10, at 350 (noting that the Directive extends to cover flights
within the EU in 2011 and all flights to or from the EU in 2012).
31.
See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 18, 31 (stating that aviation
carbon dioxide emissions only account for two percent of the world’s human-made carbon
dioxide emissions and that aviation fuel consumption is anticipated to grow at a rate of 3.0%
to 3.5% per year).
32.
See AIR TRANSPORT ACTION GROUP, supra note 6, at 4 (explaining that the aviation
industry has agreed to improve fleet fuel efficiency by 1.5% per year until 2020); see also
Reagan, supra note 10, at 375 (stating that opponents of the EU Directive may challenge the
Directive by arguing that EU member-states do not have jurisdiction to set emissions
regulations extraterritorially).
33.
See Veno, supra note 12, at 661 (explaining that the atmosphere plays an essential
role in regulating the Earth’s temperature and keeping it from becoming “a cold, barren
place”).
34.
Id.
35.
See id. (explaining that Earth’s temperature is regulated by a give-and-take
between heat coming from the sun and heat lost back into space).
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drivers of climate change.36 GHGs “affect the absorption, scattering, and
emissions of radiation within the atmosphere and at the Earth’s surface.”37
The subsequent positive or negative radiation changes in the energy balance
is expressed as radiative forcing,38 “which is used to compare warming or
cooling influences on the global climate.”39
Human activities have increased the atmospheric concentrations of
three major GHGs: carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane. 40 Since
1992, concentrations of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane, have
increased by 30%, 15%, and 145% respectively.41 Research from the IPCC
shows that “[m]any greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere for a long
time,” and in the case of carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide, several
decades. 42 Consequently, if carbon dioxide emissions remained at 1990s
levels, “they would lead to a nearly constant rate of increase in atmospheric
concentrations for at least two centuries.”43
While it is difficult to determine the exact result of climate change
in the future—from the dire to the benign—there is no single mitigation
measure available.44 Instead there is a global hodgepodge of legislation and
treaties aimed at reducing carbon dioxide output. 45 The result of this
patchwork approach is that some policies impact specific industries on a

36.
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 36–37 (2007) [hereinafter SYNTHESIS REPORT] (explaining that global
GHG emissions have grown since pre-industrial times and that changes in atmospheric
concentrations of GHGs drives climate change).
37.
Id. at 37.
38.
See id. at 36 n.4 (“Radiative forcing is a measure of the influence a factor has in
altering the balance of incoming and outgoing energy in the Earth-atmosphere system and is
an index of the importance of the factor as a potential climate change mechanism.”).
39.
Id. at 37.
40.
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, AVIATION AND THE
GLOBAL ATMOSPHERE: SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 4 (1999) [hereinafter IPCC Report,
AVIATION AND THE GLOBAL ATMOSPHERE] (explaining that atmospheric concentrations of
these three gases have grown significantly and much of the growth is attributable to human
activities); see also SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 36, at 37 (“Global atmospheric
concentrations of CO2, CH4, and N2O have increased markedly as a result of human
activities since 1750.”).
41.
See IPCC Report, AVIATION AND THE GLOBAL ATMOSPHERE, supra note 40, at 4
(summarizing conclusions from the 1995 IPCC Second Assessment Report on the effect of
anthropogenic emissions on climate change).
42.
See id. (discussing the long length of time that greenhouse gases stay in the
atmosphere).
43.
Id.
44.
See SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 36, at 73 (“A wide range of [climate change]
mitigation options is currently available or projected to be available by 2030 in all sectors.”).
45.
See id. at 62 (showing the myriad types of policy instruments and actions that
countries have taken to affect emissions).
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scale much greater than their actual contribution to climate change—which
is especially true for international aviation.46
B. Aviation and Climate Change
Aviation plays a key role in the global economy and serves as the
most efficient passenger and cargo transport available. 47 International
aviation has increased rapidly over the last few decades alongside the
growth of the world economy. 48 These international flights, however, do
contribute to the build-up of anthropogenic gases in the atmosphere.49
Aircrafts produce the same types of emissions as other vehicles
with fossil fuel combustion engines.50 Jet engines, like many other vehicles,
produce carbon dioxide, water vapor, and nitrous oxide, as well as other
trace elements.51 Aircraft engine emissions are comprised of approximately
seventy percent carbon dioxide, thirty percent water vapor, and less than
one percent other various pollutants.52 In addition to the emissions that take
place during flight, “[a]bout 10 percent of aircraft emissions of all types,
except hydrocarbons and CO [carbon monoxide], are produced during
airport ground level operations and during landing and takeoff.” 53 The
majority of aviation emissions, however, take place at much higher
altitudes.54
46.
See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 38 (recognizing that the total
amount of carbon dioxide emissions from aviation accounts for only two percent of global
carbon dioxide emissions).
47.
See AIR TRANSPORT ACTION GROUP, supra note 6, at 2 (“Aviation provides the
only rapid worldwide transportation network, which makes it essential for global business
and tourism. It plays a vital role in facilitating economic growth.”); see also Veno, supra
note 12, at 672 (explaining that international air transport is important for the world
economy because it can carry passengers and cargo over long distances in short time
periods).
48.
See IPCC Report, AVIATION AND THE GLOBAL ATMOSPHERE, supra note 40, at 3
(discussing the correlation between the growth in the world economy and the growth in the
aviation industry).
49.
See Veno, supra note 12, at 672 (discussing the effects that international flights
have on greenhouse gas emissions); see also ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5,
at 31 (“International flights are responsible for approximately 62% of [total aviation]
emissions.”).
50.
See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 38 (discussing the type of
emissions released by aircraft engines and the effect they have on climate change).
51.
OFFICE OF ENV’T & ENERGY, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AVIATION & EMISSIONS: A
PRIMER 1 (2005) [hereinafter AVIATION & EMISSIONS] (providing an overview of the
emissions released by aircraft engines).
52.
See id. (discussing the composition of aircraft emissions).
53.
Id. at 2.
54.
See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 38 (“[M]ost of these
emissions are released directly into the upper troposphere and lower stratospheres.”).
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Aircrafts emit carbon dioxide and water vapor directly into the
upper troposphere and lower stratosphere where they have a different
impact on atmospheric composition. 55 Currently, aviation emissions
contribute to approximately two to three percent of the greenhouse gas
emissions worldwide. 56 This figure, however, is expected to rise both in
terms of absolute emissions and the total percentage. 57 “[I]n the last ten
years, the airline industry has grown in absolute size, showing an increased
diversity in the categorization of airlines operating in the different markets.
Thanks to liberalization in many countries, completely new types of airlines
have been entering the air transport market.”58 As a result of this growth,
emissions from aircrafts have continued to increase every year. 59 The
aviation industry, however, remains committed to addressing aviation’s
contribution to climate change by aggressively working toward a
sustainable future.60
III. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
A. The Kyoto Protocol and EU ETS
The Kyoto Protocol established a legally binding agreement with
the commitment of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by setting target
levels of reduction.61 The Protocol entered into force on February 15, 2005,
55.
See id. at 38–39 (explaining that aircraft typically operate at cruising altitudes of
8,000–13,000 meters (26,000–40,000 feet), making the non-CO2 impacts on climate variable
because of the variable lifespans for these emissions).
56.
See AVIATION & EMISSIONS, supra note 51, at 10 (“[E]missions of the world’s
aircraft fleet [are] at about three percent of the total greenhouse emissions from fossil fuel,
the majority of which come from commercial aviation.”). But see ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL
REPORT, supra note 5, at 18 (explaining that, while fuel efficiency is expected to improve,
“an emissions ‘gap’ could exist relative to 2006 or earlier . . . ”).
57.
See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 19 (“A decrease in fares has
encouraged people of all incomes to travel more, causing a growth in air travel demand
significantly larger than what economic growth alone would have created.”).
58.
Id.
59.
See AVIATION & EMISSIONS, supra note 51, at 10 (“According to the projection,
aircraft greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. will increase 60 percent by 2025.”). But see
ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 45 (“[Discussions] of current total annual
global CO2 emissions . . . are of limited value. What is important is the total of emissions
over time. In the absence of policy intervention, aviation emissions of CO2 are projected to
increase over 2005 levels by 1.9 to 4.5 fold by 2050.”).
60.
See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 35 (“[The International Civil
Aviation Organization] and its Member States, with relevant organizations[,] will also keep
working together in undertaking further work on medium and long-term goals, including
exploring the feasibility of goals of more ambition . . . .”).
61.
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 15, at Annex B (outlining the quantified emission
limitation or reduction commitment made by each signatory Party).
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and requires all Annex I countries to implement procedures to help achieve
their target emissions level, including enhancing energy efficiency,
protecting and improving sinks,62 researching and developing new forms of
energy, and encouraging appropriate emissions reforms.63 “As signatories
of the Protocol, the EU and its Member States obligated themselves to
make measurable greenhouse gas emissions reductions.”64
The European Union had long endorsed environmental legislation
that favored command-and-control regulations.65 In the 1990s, however, the
EU transitioned away from command-and-control in favor of the more
American system of market-based regulations.66 After Kyoto was adopted,
European Union Member States found that a market-based regulation
scheme would be the most cost-effective method of meeting the emissions
reductions mandated by the Protocol.67
In order to meet the emissions reductions required by the Kyoto
Protocol, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme was created and
began operating in January of 2005, allowing Member States to distribute
carbon dioxide credits to companies that emitted large quantities of
GHGs. 68 By capping the number of credits, the EU essentially created a
market for carbon allowances.69 If an operator does not use all the credits
allocated to it, then it has the ability to sell the credits to another operator

62.
See id. at art. 1 (“‘Sink’ means any process, activity or mechanism which removes
a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.”).
63.
See id at art. 2(1)(a)(i)–(viii) (“Each Party included in Annex I in achieving its
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3 shall [i]mplement
and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its national
circumstances.”).
64.
Reagan, supra note 10, at 362.
65.
See id. at 362 n.120 (“Command-and-control systems are generally programs of
centralized regulatory commands issued in excruciating detail via permits to pollution
dischargers throughout a jurisdiction in order to implement environmental goals.”).
66.
See id. at 362 (explaining that the increased support for an EU transition “to
market-based regulatory mechanisms, [was] in large part due to the American experience
with such regulation”).
67.
See id. (describing European support for finding a “low-cost means to attain the
emissions reductions mandated by the Protocol”).
68.
See EUROPEAN COMM’N, EUROPEAN ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EU
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME, at 5 (2009) [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION], available at
http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_6_raporlar/1_3_diger/environment/eu
_emmissions_trading_scheme.pdf (“Launched at the start of 2005, the EU ETS is the
world’s first international company-level ‘cap-and-trade’ system of allowances for emitting
carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
69.
See Abeyratne, supra note 25, at 5 (discussing the structure of the EU ETS
program and how carbon allowances can be traded).

ENVIRONMENTAL OVERREACH

11

that exceeded its allowance.70 “The theory behind the scheme is that as the
demand for credits increases, the price will increase; thus, it will eventually
be cheaper for companies to invest in innovative ways to cut emissions than
to purchase more credits.”71 Ideally, emissions cuts would be made at the
lowest possible cost to the economy under this scheme.72 The EC employed
a phased introduction of the ETS to allow for periodic review and
amendment.73
The first phase began in 2005, and was limited to carbon dioxide
emissions from industrial installations in energy, metal production, mineral,
and paper industries, which account for nearly half of the EU’s carbon
dioxide emissions. 74 As the phases progress, more industries will be
included to cover more of the GHGs, while progressively tightening the
emissions caps.75 The second phase of the ETS was set to coincide with the
first Kyoto Protocol commitment period, which ran from 2008 to 2012.76
During these stages of the ETS, EU Member States developed
National Allocation Plans, which established how many emissions credits
to issue and how to apportion them to individual companies.77 The EC then
reviewed the allocation plans to ensure that they were consistent with the
emission reduction commitments set forth in the Kyoto Protocol. 78 The
ultimate goal of the ETS is to ensure that the EU is sufficiently reducing its
carbon dioxide emissions to comply with the Kyoto Protocol.79

70.
See id. (“To comply, facilities can either reduce their emissions or purchase
allowances from facilities with an excess of allowances. Progressively tightening caps are
foreseen for each new period, forcing overall reductions in emissions.”).
71.
Veno, supra note 12, at 670.
72.
See id. (explaining that when the burden to cut emissions is put on the least
expensive mechanism available, “emissions reductions will be made at the lowest cost to the
economy”).
73.
See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 68, at 8 (describing each phase of the EU
ETS implementation).
74.
See id. (stating that the first phase of implementation was a pilot phase focusing on
establishing a price for carbon allowances and collecting emissions data).
75.
See id. (noting that phases II and III will focus on reducing the allowed emissions
based on data collected in phase I).
76.
See id. (explaining that phase II of the ETS implementation process is meant to
coincide with the “first commitment period” of the Kyoto Protocol).
77.
See id. at 9 (“Member States are currently required to draw up national allocation
plans for each trading period setting out how many allowances each installation will receive
each year.”).
78.
See id. at 15–16 (explaining that, after member-states construct National
Allocation Plans for the distribution of credits, the EC reviews and assesses each allocation
plan based on specific criteria).
79.
See id. (describing the process by which the EC required member-states to align
their allocation plans with the commitments made under the Kyoto Protocol).
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B. The Aviation Directive

The Environmental Commission of the EU adopted the Directive to
include aviation within the ETS on December 20, 2006. 80 This was
introduced into the ETS in two phases. 81 First, starting in 2011, flights
between domestic airports would be required to account for their
emissions.82 Then, in 2012, the ETS was set to be extended to cover all
flights arriving at or departing from an EU airport. 83 The EU, however,
postponed the application of the ETS to flights departing the EU through
2013 pending international action on aviation emissions.84
Under the Aviation Directive, EU Member States would allocate
carbon dioxide credits to airlines much like the system set up for industrial
installments under the ETS.85 These allocations would be capped based on
the 2004–06 emissions levels of commercial airlines.86 “Airlines only have
80.
See Aviation Directive, supra note 29, at 3 (“[A]mending Directive 2003/87/EC so
as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading
within the Community.”).
81.
See Press Release, European Union, Climate Change: Commission Proposes
Bringing Air Transport into EU Emissions Trading Scheme (Dec. 20, 2006), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-1862_en.htm (“From 2011 all domestic and
international flights between EU airports will be covered, and from 2012 the scope will be
extended to all international flights arriving at or departing from EU airports.”) (on file with
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
82.
See id. (describing the implementation of the EU ETS and noting the projected
reduction of 183 million tons of CO2 emissions).
83.
See id. (noting that all airlines will be treated equally under the EU ETS); see also
Carl Burleson, The EU Emissions Trading System Proposal, 21 AIR & SPACE LAW., No. 3,
2007, at 22–23 (“For example, under the proposed legislation, on a flight from Los Angeles
to Paris, United Airlines would have to obtain permits to cover not only the emissions of the
flight in French airspace but in U.S. and international airspace over the Atlantic in order to
operate to Paris.”). But see Aviation Directive, supra note 29, at 6 (noting that where a third
country puts in place measures to reduce the climate change impact of aviation, the ETS
would not apply to flights arriving from that country).
84.
See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Your Biggest Carbon Sin May Be Air Travel, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2013, at SR4 (“[A]fter airlines and governments in the United States, India and
China went ballistic — filing lawsuits, threatening trade actions and prompting legislation
— the European Commission said it would delay full implementation for just one year to let
the naysayers accede to an alternative global plan to reduce airlines’ carbon footprint.”) (on
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
85.
See Press Release, European Union, Questions & Answers on Aviation & Climate
Change, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-06-506_en.htm (“Like
industrial installations, airlines will receive tradable allowances to emit a certain level of
CO2 per year from their flights.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
86.
See id. (“For the trading periods up until 2022, aviation emissions will be capped
at the average level for the years 2004–2006. However, should international aviation be
brought into a global climate agreement after 2012, this cap could be reviewed.”).
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to maintain present [emissions] levels, which differs from other installments
that are required to reduce their emissions to 1990 levels.”87 According to
the Directive, each aircraft operator, including those from non-EU
countries, would be administered under the program by only one Member
State. 88 “For EU [aircraft] operators, the administering state [is] the
Member State that issued their operating certificate; for the third-country
operators, it [will] be the Member State to which most of their emissions
can be attributed.” 89 The Aviation Directive essentially integrates the
airlines into the ETS market so that airlines can buy and sell allowances
from any other industry.90
Just like any other ETS participants, aircraft operators would be
required to monitor their emissions of carbon dioxide and report them to
their administering Member State by March 31 each year.91 Any airline that
does not stay within its allotted emissions will have to pay a fine at the end
of the year, and could possibly lose its contract to fly to or from EU
airports. 92 According to the Convention Between the United States and
Other Governments Respecting International Civil Aviation (Chicago

87.
Veno, supra note 12, at 675.
88.
See Daniel Calleja Crespo & Mike Crompton, The European Approach to Aviation
and Emissions Trading, 21 AIR & SPACE LAW., no. 3, 2007, at 1, 20 (explaining that this
form of administration avoids duplication and an excessive administrative burden on aircraft
operators).
89.
Id.; see also Abeyratne, supra note 25, at 5 (“The Scheme would exclude flights
by State aircraft, flights under visual flight rules, circular flights (or circuits), flights for
testing navigation equipment or for training purposes, rescue flights, and flights by aircraft
with a maximum take-off weight of less than 5,700 kilograms (approximately 12,500
pounds).”).
90.
See Reagan, supra note 10, at 364 (“The Proposed Directive would integrate the
airlines into the prior-existing ETS market so that the airlines could buy and sell allowances
across industries.”).
91.
See Abeyratne, supra note 25, at 5 (describing how reports will be independently
verified by the competent authority of their administering Member State to ensure their
accuracy); see also Veno, supra note 12, at 677 (“To monitor emissions airlines must report
their annual emissions by multiplying the amount of fuel they consumed that year by a
standard emission factor. If the airline is not capable of documenting the amount of fuel used
for each flight, then a standardized fuel consumption estimation will be applied.”).
92.
See Veno, supra note 12, at 672–77 (discussing the inclusion of aviation in the EU
ETS and the penalties that airlines will suffer for failing to stay within their allotted
emissions).
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Convention),93 all airlines must comply with the laws and regulations of the
state in which they arrive and depart, including the Aviation Directive.94
C. Justification for Including Aviation in the ETS
While the Kyoto Protocol calls for the domestic reduction of
aviation emissions for developed nations, it provides for the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 95 to guide the overall international
aviation emissions reduction. 96 In the EU, the inclusion of just domestic
aviation would only be a partial solution.97 The EC contended that for any
meaningful reduction to take place international aviation must be included
since it is responsible for the vast majority of the aviation industry’s carbon
dioxide emissions.98 “EU GHG emissions from international aviation grew
by 87 percent between 1990 and 2004.”99 Although only three percent of
EU greenhouse gas emissions are produced by aviation, “the EC projects
that by 2012, emissions from international flights would increase by 150%
from 1990 levels.”100 Furthermore, this projected growth could offset EU
Kyoto Protocol reductions by up to twenty-five percent.101 With the amount
of anticipated growth in the international aviation sector, the European

93.
Convention Between the United States of America and Other Governments
Respecting International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295
[hereinafter Chicago Convention].
94.
See id. (“The laws and regulations of a contracting State as to the admission to or
departure from its territory of passengers, crew or cargo of aircraft . . . shall be complied
with . . . upon entrance into or departure from, or while within the territory of that State.”).
95.
See Veno, supra note 12, at 673 (“The ICAO is an organization created under the
Chicago Convention agreement to oversee international flight regulations and procedures.
The ICAO is composed of 188 countries, encompassing the entire field of international civil
aviation, and it has legislative ‘authority to promulgate standards and recommended
practices (SARPs).’”).
96.
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 2 § 2 (“The Parties included in Annex I
shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the
Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the International
Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, respectively.”).
97.
See Reagan, supra note 10, at 364 (“While the inclusion of domestic aviation into
the ETS for member-states is a partial solution to the emissions problem, the EC posits that
any meaningful emissions reduction measures must also include international aviation
because it accounts for the vast majority of EU flights.”).
98.
See id. (explaining that international aviation accounts for the vast majority of EU
flights).
99.
Crespo & Crompton, supra note 88, at 19.
100.
Reagan, supra note 10, at 364–65.
101.
See id. at 365 (explaining that emissions from international flights in the near
future could offset existing emission reduction plans).
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Commission claims that failing to work toward emissions reduction in this
industry would ultimately undermine the overall efforts of the ETS.102
The European Commission acknowledged that under the Kyoto
Protocol, authorization over international aviation emissions was delegated
to the ICAO.103 Since the Protocol was agreed upon in 1997, EU Member
States and the ICAO had been working on creating a market-based
emissions trading system. 104 After studying various means to put such a
system into practice, the ICAO Committee on Aviation Environmental
Protection agreed in 2004 “that an aviation-specific emissions trading
system based on a new legal instrument under the ICAO auspices
‘. . . seemed sufficiently unattractive that it should not be pursued
further.’”105 Later that same year, the ICAO Assembly announced that work
on any further implementation “should focus on two approaches: voluntary
emissions trading and the incorporation of international aviation into a
State’s existing emissions trading schemes.”106 The EC adopted the latter
approach in its proposal and continues to cooperate with the ICAO in
emission reductions.107
In sum, the EC contends that bringing aviation into the ETS will
place pressure on the industry as a whole to mitigate the impacts from
GHGs. 108 Supporters of the regulation project allege that it will provide
incentives for international airlines to develop “green” or more efficient
technology.109 In addition, the proposal could strengthen the carbon market
as airlines will be able to trade emissions credits across industry lines.110
Conversely, the EU’s proposal has sparked debate over the legal
implications of including international aviation in the ETS.111

102.
See Rosenthal, supra note 84 (discussing American, Chinese, and Indian efforts to
evade participation in the EU ETS).
103.
See Reagan, supra note 10, at 365 (expressing the EC’s understanding of which
organization currently mandates international aviation emissions).
104.
See id. (describing the EC’s efforts to alter the existing international aviation
emissions reduction effort).
105.
Crespo & Crompton, supra note 88, at 19.
106.
Id.
107.
See Rosenthal, supra note 84 (“[T]he European Union commissioner [for climate
action], said that if the International Civil Aviation Organization fails to come up with a
solid, market-based program in September, the European Union will begin collecting the
emissions fees for all flights in and out of its airports.”).
108.
See Reagan, supra note 10, at 365 (describing how regulation will inevitably
change the industry’s emission mitigation efforts).
109.
See id. (discussing the possible outcomes of the regulation project).
110.
See id. (describing a potential benefit that could arise from the EU’s ETS
proposal).
111.
See id. (highlighting the adverse reactions from nations and aviation associations
outside of the EU’s proposal).
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IV. Implications of the Aviation Directive

The decision to include non-EU operators into the ETS drew broad
criticism from international air carriers and the governments of the United
States, China, and India. 112 Specifically, the Chinese Aviation
Administration ordered Chinese airlines to boycott the ETS and former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton strongly objected to the ETS on legal and
policy grounds. 113 In addition, the Aviation Transport Association of
America (ATA) and other major U.S. airlines brought a lawsuit before the
European Court of Justice, Europe’s highest court, “asserting that the
extraterritorial regulation of non-EU operators in the ETS is unlawful and
breaches customary international law and international agreements.”114
A. International Aviation Law
The EC contends that the Aviation Directive is within its authority
under the current international aviation regulatory framework.115 EU ETS
proponents equate the proposal to admission and departure requirements
permitted under the Chicago Convention. 116 Article 1 of the Chicago
Convention confirms that every State has exclusive sovereignty over the
airspace above its territory. 117 Article 6 provides that “[n]o scheduled
international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a
contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization
of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or
authorization.”118 Furthermore, under Article 11, a contracting State may
apply admissions and departure requirements to international aircraft
entering or leaving the state, so long as they are applied without distinction
to nationality and in accordance with the provisions of the Chicago

112.
See Rosenthal, supra note 84 (discussing the lawsuits filed and threats of trade
action made by air carriers and governments in response to the EU’s ETS proposal).
113.
See Roger Martella et al., Lessons Learned: The EU and its Aviation Directive, 43
TRENDS, Mar./Apr. 2012 at 1 (describing the adverse responses to the EU’s ETS proposal).
114.
Id. at 1.
115.
See Reagan, supra note 10, at 369 (explaining the EU’s argument that the
regulation is legal under the existing aviation regulatory framework).
116.
See id. at 369–70 (analogizing the EU’s ETS proposal to the admission and
departure requirements permissible under the Chicago Convention and air service
agreements (ASAs)).
117.
See Chicago Convention, supra note 94, at art. 1 (“The contracting States
recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above
its territory.”).
118.
Id. at art. 6.
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Convention. 119 Based upon these provisions, the EU contends that the
Chicago Convention supports the extension of ETS to international
aviation.120
On the other hand, opponents of the Aviation Directive can provide
an equally compelling case that the regulation is impermissible under the
Chicago Convention.121 As previously mentioned, Article 1 of the Chicago
Convention gives a State exclusive jurisdiction over its territorial
airspace.122 In this case, however, the EU proposed to extend the ETS to all
flights arriving at or departing from an EU airport, while exempting those
countries that establish measures to reduce the climate change impact of
aviation.123
Under international law, a state can only apply jurisdiction beyond
its territorial limits when the conduct being regulated has a substantial
effect within its territory. 124 Although a state can gain jurisdiction over
conduct outside its territory, “[A] state may not exercise jurisdiction to
prescribe with respect to a person or activity having connections with
another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.” 125
Essentially, if the extension of jurisdiction is found to be unreasonable, then
the state cannot exert authority beyond its borders.126
In addition to the extra-jurisdictional issues associated with the
Aviation Directive, the EU ETS also imposed potential penalties and costs
associated with compliance on international airlines.127 These costs could
119.
See id. at art. 11 (“[T]he laws and regulations of a contracting State relating to the
admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation
. . . shall be applied to the aircraft of all contracting States without distinction as to
nationality.”).
120.
See Reagan, supra note 10, at 370 (describing the EU’s conclusion that the ETS
incorporation of aviation is legal because it is similar to the Chicago Convention).
121.
See id. at 371 (explaining that opponents of the Aviation Directive argue that the
plan “amounts to an impermissible operating requirement, tax, or charge, or . . . that the EC
lacks jurisdiction to prescribe emissions regulation to operation in international aviation”).
122.
See Chicago Convention, supra note 94, at art. 1 (“The contracting States
recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above
its territory.”).
123.
See Abeyratne, supra note 25, at 6 (describing how the EU is attempting to extend
its carbon dioxide emissions trading scheme to include conduct outside of its territory,
namely international flights).
124.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1)(c) (1987) (“[A]
state has jurisdiction to proscribe law with respect to conduct outside its territory that has or
is intended to have substantial effect within its territory . . . .”).
125.
Id. § 403(1).
126.
See id. § 403(2)(a)–(h) (describing the factors for determining whether the use of
jurisdiction is unreasonable).
127.
See Rosenthal, supra note 84 (explaining that the EU ETS would cost US airlines
$3.1 billion between 2012 and 2020).
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functionally be construed as a tax or fee that is not related to the cost of
providing aeronautic facilities or services. 128 Article 15 of the Chicago
Convention specifically prohibits the imposition of fees on airlines for the
right of transit over, exit from, or entry into the contracting State. 129 It
seems that the EU’s legislation would require international airlines to pay
for emissions allowances simply for the right to land or take off. 130
“Although there is not a direct charge placed on airlines, the stringent
requirements under the EU ETS would require that airlines pay a ‘charge’
to emit carbon when flying into those airports, and any airlines that do not
comply could possibly lose their contract at those airports.”131 The airline
receives nothing in return for this charge, with the exception of being able
to operate within the EU. 132 Therefore, the Aviation Directive could be
construed as a violation of Article 15 of the Chicago Convention.133
As a result, the aforementioned EU contention that Article 11
provides authority for the inclusion of aviation in the ETS would be
rendered moot.134 Article 11 is limited in that the laws and regulations of
contracting States pertaining to admission and departure must be consistent
with the provisions of the Chicago Convention.135 If the Aviation Directive
is found to be in violation of Article 15, the EU will not be able to rely on
Article 11 to justify its inclusion of international aviation in the ETS.136 The

128.
See Burleson, supra note 83, at 23 (discussing the variety of problems that have
been associated with the EU ETS).
129.
See Chicago Convention, supra note 94, at art. 15(b) (“No fees, dues or other
charges shall be imposed by any contracting State in respect solely of the right of transit over
or entry into or exit from its territory of any aircraft of a contracting State or persons or
property thereon.”).
130.
See Burleson, supra note 83, at 23–24 (explaining how the EU ETS violates article
15 of the Chicago Convention by requiring airlines to pay for emissions allowances in order
to land or take off within the EU).
131.
Veno, supra note 12, at 685.
132.
See Burleson, supra note 83, at 23 (describing the reasons that the airline industry
is opposed to the EU ETS).
133.
See Charles E. Smith, Air Transportation Taxation: The Case for Reform, 75 J.
AIR L. & COM. 915, 939 (2010) (“It is a well known—but publicly ignored—fact that several
foreign governments may violate this sentence [of Article 15 of the Chicago Convention] by
charging air passengers a fee merely for the privilege of entering or exiting the country.
Chile, for example, charges an ‘Entry Fee’ of $131.”).
134.
See Burleson, supra note 83, at 23 (explaining that the EU does not have the
authority to promulgate the ETS under Article 11 of the Chicago Convention).
135.
See id. at 23–24 (arguing that the EU’s reading of Article 11 of the Chicago
Convention would result in virtually no restriction of a signatories right to impose charges
for international aviation on airlines, contrary to Article 11).
136.
See id. at 24 (discussing the applicability of Articles 11 and 15 of the Chicago
Convention to the EU ETS).
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viability of any challenge to the Aviation Directive under Article 15 would
ultimately hinge on what constitutes a charge or a tax.137
B. European Court of Justice
On December 21, 2011, the European Court of Justice rejected the
claims of an airline trade association and three U.S. airlines that the
inclusion of international air carriers in the EU ETS violated customary
international law and international treaties.138 In deciding the case, the ECJ
examined two questions.139 First, the court determined whether the plaintiff
airlines and trade association—as individuals and not state actors—could
use international agreements and customary international law to challenge
the Aviation Directive.140 Second, the court looked at whether those laws, if
applicable, would invalidate the Directive.141
From the outset, the ECJ stated that the Chicago Convention did
not bind the EU.142 The court reasoned that although all twenty-seven EU
Member States were a party to the treaty, the EU, as a separate entity had
not signed the agreement.143 Rather, the EU was merely an observer under
the Chicago Convention.144 Therefore, the court determined that plaintiffs
could not use the Chicago Convention to challenge the validity of the
Aviation Directive.145
137.
See Reagan, supra note 10, at 374 (describing how EU representatives argue that
emissions trading is distinct from a charge or tax and how opponents to the EU’s proposal
argue is a charge or tax because it is a unilaterally imposed cost).
138.
See generally Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Sec’y of State for
Energy & Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. 00000 (Dec. 21, 2011).
139.
See id. ¶ 45 (setting out the issues left to be addressed in this case); see also JANE
A. LEGGETT ET. AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42392, AVIATION AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION’S
EMISSION
TRADING
SCHEME
23
(2012),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42392.pdf (summarizing the European Court of Justice’s
opinion).
140.
See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. ¶ 45 (noting that the court must examine
customary international law, the Chicago Convention, the Open Skies Agreement, and the
Kyoto Protocol in order to determine whether the EU directive is challengeable).
141.
See id. (explaining that the court will undergo a similar analytic structure as the
first issue, whether the EU directive is challengeable).
142.
See id. ¶ 71 (explaining that EU Member States have not given over all control of
aviation in their countries to the EU).
143.
See id. ¶¶ 69–72 (describing the reason that the Chicago Convention does not
apply to the EU).
144.
See id. ¶¶ 69–70 (explaining that the EU has not assumed “exclusive competence
in the entire field of international civil aviation” because some Member States have retained
powers within the realm of the Chicago Convention).
145.
See id. ¶ 72 (“It follows that in the context of the present reference for a
preliminary ruling the Court cannot examine the validity of [the Aviation Directive] in the
light of the Chicago Convention as such.”).
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Conversely, the court found that the EU was indeed bound by the
Kyoto Protocol.146 The airlines and trade association argued that the Kyoto
protocol specifically named ICAO as the vehicle for aviation emissions
reductions, and accordingly, that the EU must refrain from independent
action. 147 The court, however, found that in order for an individual to
challenge the validity of the Aviation Directive under an international
agreement, the specific provision relied upon must be “unconditional and
sufficiently precise so as to confer on persons subject to European Union
law the right to rely thereon in legal proceedings in order to contest the
legality of an act of European Union law.”148 With respect to the ICAO
provision in the Kyoto Protocol, the court stated:
[T]hat provision, as regards its content, cannot in any event
be considered to be unconditional and sufficiently precise
so as to confer on individuals the right to rely on it in legal
proceedings in order to contest the validity of Directive
2008/101. Consequently, the Kyoto Protocol cannot be
relied upon in the context of the present reference for a
preliminary ruling for the purpose of assessing the validity
of Directive 2008/101.149
Consequently, the plaintiffs could not rely upon either the Chicago
Convention or the Kyoto Protocol in their challenge of the Aviation
Directive.150
Despite not allowing challenges to the Aviation Directive under the
Chicago Convention or Kyoto Protocol, the court did allow the airlines and
trade association to rely on the Open Skies Agreement and some principals
of international customary law. 151 Similar to Article 15 of the Chicago
Convention, Article 11 of the Open Skies Agreement prohibits customs

146.
See id. ¶¶ 73–74 (evaluating whether the Kyoto Protocol precludes the court from
determining the Aviation Directive’s validity and whether the Kyoto Protocol’s provisions
give those subject to EU law the right to rely on Kyoto in order to challenge other EU laws).
147.
See id. ¶¶ 43, 77 (stating that pleading the Aviation Directive was invalid).
148.
Id. ¶ 74.
149.
Id. ¶¶ 77–78.
150.
See id. ¶¶ 72, 78 (rejecting both laws as a basis to examine the Aviation Directive).
151.
See id. ¶¶ 87, 94, 100, 111 (allowing evaluation of the Aviation Directive in light
of the Open Skies Agreement and international law); see also LEGGETT ET AL., supra note
139, at 25 (noting the plaintiff could “challenge the [Aviation] Directive pursuant to the
customary international law principles of (1) complete state sovereignty over its airspace; (2)
freedom of flight over the high seas; and (3) the high seas are free from state sovereignty”).
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taxes or fees from being placed on fuel that is on board the aircraft.152 As
such, the plaintiffs asserted that the EU ETS constituted an impermissible
duty, tax, fee or charge on fuel consumption under the Open Skies
Agreement.153
In rejecting the claim that the EU ETS was a tax, the court
acknowledged that the cost imposed on aircraft operators was, in part,
based upon fuel consumption.154 The ECJ, however, ruled that “there is no
direct and inseverable link between the quantity of the fuel held or
consumed by an aircraft and the pecuniary burden on the aircraft’s operator
in the context of the allowance trading scheme’s operation.”155 Indeed, the
court went on to distinguish the EU ETS from a tax by noting that under the
scheme, an airline could potentially make a profit by burning less fuel and
selling the leftover allowances. 156 Ultimately, it was this distinction
between a market-based measure and a tax that lead the ECJ to find the EU
ETS permissible under Article 11 of the Open Skies Agreement.157
The implication of this decision is that the ECJ sees a tax as only a
fixed value.158 Taxes, however, often fluctuate based on the value of what is
being taxed.159 For instance, taxes on fuel or real estate that are based on a
152.
See Air Transp. Ass’n. of Am., Inc. ¶ 136 (discussing arguments by the airlines and
trade associations that fuel loads are exempted from duties, taxes, fees and charges under
Article 11(1) and 2(c) of the Open Skies Agreement).
153.
See id. (discussing Air Transportation Association of America’s contention that,
“only charges based on the cost of the service provided can be imposed by the European
Union” and that the scheme in the EU ETS directive does not fall within this exception); see
also LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 139, at 25–26 (discussing the airlines’ and trade
associations’ argument that the Aviation Directive “imposes an impermissible tax or duty
levied on airline fuel”).
154.
See Air Transp. Ass’n. of Am., Inc. ¶ 141 (noting that aircraft fuel consumption
was part of the formula which calculated emissions); see also Katherine B. Andrus, Beyond
Aircraft Emissions: The European Court of Justice’s Decision May have Far-Reaching
Implications, 24 AIR & SPACE LAW. No. 4, 13, 16 (2012) (noting that the ECJ distinguishes
costs from a fuel charge because it is a market-based measure).
155.
Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. ¶ 142.
156.
See id. (“Nor can it be ruled out that an aircraft operator, despite having held or
consumed fuel, will bear no pecuniary burden resulting from its participation in the
allowance trading scheme, or will even make a profit by assigning its surplus allowances for
consideration.”); see also LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 139, at 26 (noting the ECJ argument
that the airlines could make a profit by burning less fuel and selling excess emission
allowances).
157.
See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. ¶ 143–44 (noting a difference between the EU
Aviation Directive and a Swedish scheme that taxed fuel consumption and constituted an
unlawful excise duty on aviation).
158.
See Andrus, supra note 154, at 16 (arguing that the ECJ implies a tax “must
always use a fixed value”).
159.
See id. (arguing that there are many examples which contradict the view that a tax
is a fixed value).
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percentage of the price will vary based upon the market price.160 “In the
case of the [EU] ETS, it can just as easily be viewed as a tax on fuel that
simply uses a different currency (i.e. allowances) that fluctuates in
value.”161 While there is no direct charge per ton on the fuel consumed—
and subsequent carbon emitted—the chosen currency does not change the
fact that the EU ETS operates as a tax.162
C. EU Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011
In response to the EU ETS, a historically divided 112th Congress
swiftly approved—with large bi-partisan support—the European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011 (EU ETS Prohibition
Act).163 Arguably one of the greatest legislative accomplishments of 2012,
the Act essentially functions as the title indicates: it prohibits U.S. aircraft
operators from participating in the EU ETS.164 The EU ETS Prohibition Act
allows the Secretary of Transportation to prohibit U.S. carriers from
complying with the EU ETS based upon a public interest determination.165
In making the public interest determination the Secretary must take into
account: “(1) the impacts on U.S. consumers, U.S. carriers, and U.S.
operators; (2) the impacts on the economic, energy, and environmental
security of the United States; and (3) the impacts on U.S. foreign relations,
including existing international commitments.”166

160.
See id. (“[A] fuel tax assessed as a percentage of the value of fuel consumed would
fluctuate along with the price of fuel. Similarly, real estate taxes are typically calculated as a
percentage of a property’s value, which in turn is based roughly on its market price, which
may rise or fall.”).
161.
Id.
162.
See id. (arguing that because the cost imposed on aircraft operators is based on
fuel consumption and charged at a rate set by the government, it constitutes a tax even if it
could also be considered a market-based measure).
163.
See European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, 49
U.S.C. § 40101 (“An Act To prohibit operators of civil aircraft of the United States from
participating in the European Union’s emissions trading scheme, and for other purposes.”);
see also Rosenthal, supra note 84 (“[O]ne bill glided through Congress with broad bipartisan
support and won a quick signature from President Obama . . . .”).
164.
See id. (“The Secretary of Transportation shall prohibit an operator of a civil
aircraft of the United States from participating in the emissions trading scheme unilaterally
established by the European Union . . . .”); see also LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 139, at 31
(noting that one possible consequence of the legislation is the exclusion of operators serving
the EU from the EU aviation market).
165.
See 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012) (describing the role and responsibility of the
Secretary of Transportation under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
Prohibition Act of 2011).
166.
Id.
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In addition, the EU ETS Prohibition Act instructs the Secretary of
Transportation and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration to “use their authority to conduct international negotiations,
including using their authority to conduct international negotiations to
pursue a worldwide approach to address aircraft emissions.” 167 It also
directs the Administrator to ensure that U.S. carriers are held harmless
under the EU ETS.168
The EU ETS Prohibition Act was, in part, ultimately effective;
shortly after its passage, the EU, bending to international outcry, announced
that it would delay implementation for a year.169 But the EU continued to
pressure the ICAO to develop a market-based measure, threatening to
resume collecting emissions fees on all flights beginning in September of
2013.170 That effort has met with mixed success. Although the ICAO has
since agreed to develop a plan over the next three years for an aviation
emissions market to come online in 2020, ICAO did not allow the EU to
subject airlines to its emissions scheme in the meantime.171
D. Taxing Is No Solution
On international flights, government taxes and fees can add up to
$350 to the base fare of a ticket. 172 If allowed to rise unfettered, tax
increases could erode passenger demand, undermining the numerous public
and economic policy goals that aviation supports.173 “The problem with the

167.
Id.
168.
See id. (“The Secretary of Transportation . . . take other actions under existing
authorities that are in the public interest necessary to hold operators of civil aircraft of the
United States harmless from the emissions trading scheme . . . .”).
169.
See Rosenthal, supra note 84 (noting that the EU would delay implementation to
allow opposing countries to agree on an alternative global plan for emission reduction).
170.
See id. (requiring the ICAO to develop a global emissions plan or risk the EU
collection of emission fees).
171.
See Ewa Krukowska, Global Emissions Plan for Airlines Gets First UN Approval,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2013, 9:13 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-04/carboncuts-loom-for-airlines-as-icao-eyes-global-market.html (discussing the UN’s approval of a
market-based approach to reduce emissions by the airline industry) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
172.
See Smith, supra note 133, at 915 (arguing that the airline industry is not solely to
blame for the rise in costs of airfare and that government imposed fees are partly to blame).
173.
See id. at 935 (“Aviation employs large numbers of people at various skill levels.
This contributes greatly to local employment rates, tax bases, and disposable incomes. In
addition, aviation stimulates economies by guaranteeing that firms have convenient access to
much-needed air service.”).
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European trading scheme is that it began with a market-based measure—a
tax.”174
A market-based measure is designed to influence behavior by
providing financial incentives and disincentives for certain results.175 Taxes
operate in a similar fashion, promoting the change of behavior to limit
overall tax liability.176 For a market-based measure, the only real difference
is that the market, rather than the government, determines the exact
financial burden or benefit.177 The government, however, is still imposing a
cost to influence behavior whether it is through the creation of the market
or through a tax.178
This fact goes to the root of the problem with the EU ETS, the need
for incentives.179 International aviation already has the proper incentive to
increase efficiency and reduce emissions, which can be summed up in two
words: fuel costs.180 Jet fuel represents airlines’ largest cost, edging close to
thirty percent of all operating expenses.181 “Annually, a 1 cent increase in a
gallon costs U.S. airlines $175 million; a one dollar increase in a barrel
costs them $415 million.”182 This provides all the incentives airlines need to
reduce fuel consumption and, as a result, emissions.183 Indeed, U.S. airlines
174.
Rosenthal, supra note 84 (quoting Nancy Young, the vice president for
environmental affairs of Airlines for America).
175.
See Andrus, supra note 1544, at 16 (explaining that a market-based measure
differs from a tax in the mechanism that is used and not the predictability of cost
compliance).
176.
See id. (“[T]he target of a tax may be expected to operate within certain limits to
avoid paying higher taxes, or to invest in new equipment to receive a tax break.”).
177.
See id. (“The primary difference is that, for a market-based measure, the ‘market,’
rather than the government, sets the amount of the financial penalty or reward.”).
178.
See id. (“[It] is still the government imposing that cost, whether it is styled a tax,
charge, or market-based measure.”).
179.
See LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 139, at 18–19 (demonstrating that the incentives
for airlines to comply with the Aviation Directive are minimal when airlines pass the costs
onto their customers).
180.
See id. at 20 (arguing that higher fuel costs alone are sufficient to encourage
efficiency and increased biofuel use, curbing emissions).
181.
See A4A Quarterly Cost Index: U.S. Passenger Airlines, AIRLINES FOR AMERICA,
http://www.airlines.org/Pages/A4A-Quarterly-Cost-Index-U.S.-Passenger-Airlines.aspx (last
visited Sept. 11, 2013) (reporting that fuel per gallon is 28.3% of operating expenses) (on
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
182.
John Heimlich, The Price of Jet Fuel and Its Impact on U.S. Airlines, AIRLINES
FOR AMERICA, http://www.airlines.org/Pages/The-Price-of-Jet-Fuel-and-Its-Impact-on-U.S.Airlines.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 2013) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
183.
See LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 137, at 20 (“Rising fuel expenses also require a
rising share of airlines’ revenues, from around 12%–15% in 2002 to around 26%–35% in
2010.”).
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have reduced their fuel intensity (energy consumed per passenger mile) by
forty-one percent, more than any other mode of transportation. 184 In
addition, airlines are investing in a host of advances that will continue to
save fuel and reduce emissions. 185 These include improved aircraft
management, modernized aircraft fleets, and biomass-based fuels.186 Since
the current market structure already provides incentives for airlines to
reduce emissions there is no need for unilateral market-based measures or
carbon taxes on international aviation.187
V. Conclusion
The Aviation Directive was developed to help the EU reach its
target emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. 188 The Kyoto
Protocol, however, specifically designated the ICAO as the entity that
should regulate emissions from international aviation.189 Furthermore, the
Chicago Convention charges the ICAO with creating uniformity in
international aviation regulation. 190 Therefore, regardless of the ECJ
opinion, the ICAO is the only appropriate body to decide whether it is even
appropriate to develop, implement, and direct an international aviation
emissions initiative.191
The Aviation Directive embodies the fundamental flaw where
unilateral action is forced upon other state actors in a misguided effort to
address a perceived problem that is already being addressed on the

184.
See id. at 6 (discussing the improvement in airline fuel efficiency between 1990
and 2008).
185.
See id. at 6–7 (noting that more efficient aircraft designs, alternative fuels, and
improved air traffic control will further reduce fuel usage).
186.
See id. at 7 (noting that air traffic modernization efforts will reduce emissions by a
predicted fourteen million tons, modernized aircraft fleets will lead to a twenty-five percent
reduction in CO2 emissions, and the use of biomass fuels “can have a net CO2 emissions
approaching zero”).
187.
See id. at 19 n.57 (arguing that the cost of fuel is a more significant driver of
aviation fuel demand than carbon allowances).
188.
See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (outlining the Kyoto Protocol’s and
ICAO’s roles).
189.
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 2, § 2 (assigning ICAO as one of several
bodies responsible for reducing emissions).
190.
See Chicago Convention, supra note 94, at art. 37 (charging the ICAO with
adopting and amending international standards to ensure the highest degree of collaboration
between contracting states).
191.
See Reagan, supra note 10, at 380 (“International aviation emissions reductions
should be aggressively pursued through the ICAO because it is responsive to the political,
technical, and legal implications raised by the regulation.”).
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international stage.192 The EU should not apply the ETS to international air
carriers and should stop subverting the global efforts to reduce emissions.193
The airline industry is committed to aggressive emissions reductions
including “an annual average fuel and CO2 efficiency improvement of 1.5
percent through 2020 and carbon-neutral growth from 2020, with an
aspirational goal of a 50 percent reduction in CO2 by 2050 relative to 2005
levels.” 194 If, and only if, airlines cannot live up to these commitments
should ICAO proceed with a tax or market-based measure seeking to limit
emissions.195

192.
See Sean Lengell, Europeans Eye Tough Emissions Rules for Airlines, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2006, at A3 (quoting Federal Aviation Association spokeswoman Laura
Brown) (“Such a unilateral approach [by the EU] will prove unworkable and will undercut
rather than support international efforts to implement system improvements to better manage
aviation emissions impacts.”).
193.
See Veno, supra note 12, at 687 (“If they impose this scheme despite the
dissatisfaction of so many key players, they could in turn create an adverse effect of
increasing the amount of carbon emissions from international aviation traffic.”).
194.
ATA Challenges the Application of the EU ETS to U.S. Airlines, AIRLINES FOR
AMERICA,
http://www.airlines.org/Pages/ATA-challenges-the-application-of-the-EU-ETS-to-U.S.Airlines.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 2013) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
195.
See LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 139, at 23 (outlining the ATA arguments against
the Aviation Directive, in particular “that any environmental standards or market-based
mechanisms to reduce GHG from aviation should be implemented through ICAO”).

